I'm pleased to recommend to you a book I just read, Sarah Chayes' Thieves of State, Why Corruption Threatens Global Security. Here are some excerpts from a review provided by Budd Shenkin:
Chayes' thesis is
that failed states are not really failed states, they are countries
captured and run by criminal associations. Their modus operandi
is the shakedown at all levels. Therefore, the strategy of the
United States – first to establish stability and only afterwards to
root out corruption – does not and cannot work. Oppression is not
a good strategy for the long term.
Chayes starts
with Afghanistan, where she started out working for NPR and then left
to work for an NGO headed by the older brother of one Hamid Karzai.
She soon discovered that the Karzai's could easily have been directed
by Francis Ford Coppola, the only problem being to decide who was
Michael, who was Sonny, and who was Fredo. She literally watched the
CIA hand over large bills to one of the brothers wrapped in aluminum
foil. She did not witness the obtaining of a receipt.
Chayes' thesis to
end corruption first is based on obtaining the good will of the
people. They are the ones who are actually oppressed and extorted.
Chayes cites four or five “mirror” would-be ruler advisers, the
most familiar being Machiavelli, who have sought to bring reason to
rulers through the ages. They all say the same thing, that you have
to be basically fair to the people, responsible for them in rooting
out the corruption of your subordinates, etc. If you don't act this
way, they will revolt, and that the revolt will often be based on an
extreme religious element, such as Martin Luther. Viewed this way,
one comes to think of the Taliban and other Islamic movements as a
typical reaction to official corruption.
It's nice to think of a Westphalian world where states respect each
others' boundaries and internal politics, where legitimacy is
respected inside and outside of the state. Unfortunately, with these
kleptocratic states, that's not going to be possible. They will
experience upheaval and threaten those around them and increasingly
the rest of the globalized world. It's not a bad idea to try to help
the states develop internal legitimacy and coherence. But to help
them, the helpers need to understand both those states and the
mirror-writers and history. There is little evidence that this is
happening at anything like the scale we need.
It's a powerful
argument in a short book.